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137583,1/16/2008 17:47,08BUENOSAIRES62,Embassy Buenos Aires,
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY,
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SIPDIS
SENSITIVE
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STATE FOR DS/DSS, DS/DSS/IP, DS/IP/WHA, DS/IP/OPO, DS/IP/ITA,
DS/DSS/OSAC, DS/T/ATA,
POSTS FOR RSO

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: ASEC, AR
SUBJECT: ANNUAL OVERSEAS SECURITY ADVISORY COUNCIL (OSAC) CRIME AND SAFETY REPORT
REF: 07 SECSTATE 168473
SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED - PROTECT ACCORDINGLY

1. (SBU) OVERALL CRIME AND SAFETY:

Traffic accidents are still the primary threat to life and limb in Argentina, especially in Buenos Aires. Pedestrians should be vigilant when crossing streets and remember to look both directions, even if the street is designated one way. Traffic laws are routinely not obeyed and vehicles often travel at excessive speeds. Recently published statistics in www.perfil.com and www.luchemos.org.ar report that over 8000 deaths occurred in Argentina in 2007 due to traffic accidents, more than 500 more victims than in 2006 (22 deaths per day).

Crime is a serious problem in Argentina, but one that can be managed with common sense precautions. Street crime has become common and increasingly more violent, and often is perpetrated with a firearm. The head of the Argentine Interior Security Commission and media sources (www.inecip.org and www.parlamentario.com) indicate that there are anywhere between 800,000 to 2 million unregistered weapons in Argentina.

While criminal activity is a common problem and on the rise, it is concentrated in urban areas, especially Greater Buenos Aires, Cordoba, Rosario, and Mendoza. The wealthier parts of metro Buenos Aires experience high rates of property crime, with high-income neighborhoods often registering twice as many complaints as some of the poorer and supposedly more dangerous parts of town.

In the countryside, there have been a few tourists robbed in isolated areas and occasional burglaries of hotel rooms in resort areas. Mendoza has been the site of two commando-style robberies at up-scale vineyards in the last four months. Highway robbery largely affects commercial vehicles and hijacking of inter-city buses is uncommon.

Urban crime includes: pick pocketing/purse snatching, scams, mugging, express kidnapping, residential burglary, home invasion, thefts from vehicles (smash and grab), sexual assaults/rape, car theft and carjacking. Short-term visitors to urban areas are subject to all types of street crime, but report few problems with public transportation or with four and five star hotels.

Thieves specifically target expensive jewelry and watches, especially high-value items such as Rolexes. Long-term residents are subject to the full range of criminal activity on the street while driving, traveling, and at home.

Express kidnapping (short duration/low ransom) continues along with conventional mugging. Extortion kidnapping for ransom has so far only affected well-off Argentines. The true rate of kidnapping is unknown, but considerably lower than in Brazil or Colombia. Virtual kidnapping, a telephone scam in which the caller claims to have kidnapped someone who is simply not at home, continues to be a regular occurrence. Such calls often come from jails and the callers ask for prepaid phone cards, which are a form of money inside prisons.

Many criminals are armed and ready to use their weapons at the first sign of resistance. Policemen are frequently killed in Buenos Aires and close to 100 police officers were murdered or seriously wounded in Argentina during 2006. Crimes occur at all hours and armed robberies often take place during business hours. Favorite targets for armed robberies are banks and businesses dealing in cash or high-value merchandise. Apartment invasions and burglaries are common, and occasionally entire buildings are taken hostage. Criminals regularly go through neighborhoods and apartment buildings ringing doorbells and robbing those who open the door.

Argentina is still considered a transit country for drugs, but local consumption is increasing. Media reports cite the growing use of cocaine and other derivatives by middle-class youths.

2. (SBU) POLITICAL VIOLENCE:

There are weekly demonstrations in Greater Buenos Aires and frequent demonstrations in other major cities. Most protests are related to domestic economic and political issues including labor disputes. U.S. interests are occasionally targeted based on current events, such as the recent coverage of the Antonini Wilson case in Miami, the Iraq war, economic policy, or policy toward Cuba. The largest and most disruptive protests are usually sponsored by the “”piqueteros”” (a collection of “”social activist”” groups whose main tactic is to block roads). In Buenos Aires, demonstrations most commonly occur downtown and often end up at the Plaza de Mayo, Casa Rosada, Congress, or the monument on 9 de Julio. Protesters generally come from labor unions, unemployed/underemployed/landless movements, student groups, and the political left. While most protests are peaceful, there are “”hooligan”” elements that periodically show up to fight the police and/or engage in vandalism. The police are generally restrained unless attacked by hooligans. In addition to the organized demonstrations, there are occasional, spontaneous protests by groups of displaced workers, unemployed persons, unpaid pensioners, people upset by electricity cuts, etc.

Despite the negative perception of various USG policies, Argentines are relatively friendly to Americans, and visitors are unlikely to experience any anti-American sentiment.

Pipe bombs or incendiary attacks are occasionally used during the more violent demonstrations. Targets over the last year have included bank branches, municipal or public utility offices, McDonald’s restaurants, and Blockbuster Video stores.

There is no known operational terrorist activity in Argentina, but the recently issued Argentine arrest warrants implicating Hezbollah and former Iranian leaders in the 1994 AMIA bombing continue to generate considerable interest. Care should be exercised when traveling in Brazil and Paraguay, near the Argentine border. These organizations are involved in the trafficking of illicit goods, and some individuals in the area have been disgusted by the U.S. Treasury Department for financially supporting terrorist organizations.

3. (SBU) POST-SPECIFIC CONCERNS:

Argentina experiences occasional flooding along the coast, including parts of Buenos Aires, and in low-lying parts of the interior, such as Santa Fe Province. Western/northwestern provinces, such as Mendoza, Salta, Jujuy, and Tucuman periodically have earthquakes.

Road conditions are good, but traffic is fast throughout the country and heavy in the big cities. Drivers are very aggressive and oblivious to lane designations and other traffic laws. As addressed earlier, the accident rate involving pedestrians is very high.

4. (U) POLICE RESPONSE:

Expatriates can generally expect better police response and less harassment than in many other Latin American countries. Individuals detained by the police should ask to contact the Embassy or consulate. In Buenos Aires, the tourist Police assists many tourists with language services to file police reports.

Checkpoints are common, especially around Buenos Aires, and drivers must have all documentation, including passport or Argentine ID card, driving license, vehicle registration and proof of third-party liability insurance. If a police officer asks for a bribe, immediately report this occurrence to the Embassy.

5. (U) POLICE EMERGENCY NUMBERS:

CAPITAL FEDERAL POLICE: 9-1-1 or 4383-1111 through 1119
Prefectura (Coast Guard): 4318-7558 o 4318-7400 int. 2011 Av Macacha Guemes 150
Tourist Police: 4346-5748 Corrientes 436, Capital turista@policiafederal.gov.ar
Fire: 100 or 4951-2222, 4381-2222, 4383-2222
BUENOS AIRES PROVINCIAL POLICE (suburbs): 9-1-1

6. (U). MEDICAL EMERGENCIES:

CAPITAL FEDERAL (City of Buenos Aires):

SAME: 107 or 4923-1051/9
(Municipal Emergency Medical Service)

HOSPITAL ADDRESS PHONE

Hospital Fernandez Cervino 3356 4808-2600
Hospital Aleman Pueyrredon 1640 4821-1700
Sanatorio Trinidad Cervino 4720 4127-5555

BUENOS AIRES PROVINCE (suburbs):

HOSPITAL ADDRESS PHONE

San Isidro JJ Diaz 818, San Isidro 4512-3700
San Lucas Belgrano 369, San Isidro 4732-8888
Sanatorio Trinidad Fleming 590, San Isidro 4793-6766

7. (U) SECURITY TIPS:

CARRY CASH: 100-200 US$ or 300-400 pesos. Criminals in Argentina frequently resort to violence if they perceive a victim is being uncooperative or if the target does not have anything worth stealing. The people most likely to be attacked or beaten are those without any money. If confronted, offer no resistance and immediately hand over everything demanded.

DO NOT WEAR ROLEXES, or other flashy or expensive jewelry that draws attention. Women should safeguard their purses while walking and when eating in restaurants or cafes.

Criminals are often well-dressed and crime can occur anytime during the day at any location. Use common sense and remain vigilant. Travel in groups when possible. Always stay in well lit, populated areas and avoid parks after dark.

Be alert to pick pocketing in tourist and shopping areas. Do not flash large amounts of cash, or carry expensive looking bags, briefcases, or laptop cases in public.

Do not carry all of your important documents in your wallet or purse. Carry a photocopy of your passport.

Use ATM machines located in public places like the hotel, shopping mall, or event venue. If the booth has a door, make sure it closes behind you.

If you are in a restaurant or other business that gets robbed, follow the instructions of the robbers and hand over valuables on demand.

MUSTARD ON THE BACK SCAM: Unknown to you, a liquid is squirted on your back. After a few steps, someone, often a middle-aged woman, will inform you that you have something on your back and offer to help clean it off. Meanwhile, she or an accomplice picks your pockets. This scam has been used regularly in tourist areas such as San Telmo, La Boca, 9 de Julio, Recoleta, and Florida Street. Fortunately, this is one of the least confrontational crimes; just say “”NO”” and walk away.

Pay with exact change as much as possible. If you pay for a small item with a large bill, you risk being shortchanged or getting counterfeit in change. Only take pesos as change.

Use credit cards only at the hotel and major stores and restaurants.

Watch your bills carefully for fraudulent charges.

8. (U) TRANSPORTATION

Remises (hired car and driver) are the best public transportation. They charge by the kilometer and are reasonably priced. Hotels, many restaurants, and shopping centers can call one from an established service.

Radio taxis are the next best choice. Taxis are black and yellow in the Capital, and white with blue lettering in the Provinces.

Avoid black and yellow taxis with the word MANDATARIA on the door.

These taxis are rented on a daily or hourly basis and are often involved in criminal acts.

Do not take rides offered by people on the street or outside an airport.

The following is in order of preference is recommended: a) Call for a remise or taxi, b) take one from an established stand, c) hail one on the street (but not in front of a bank).

USE the seatbelts, lock the doors, and keep windows up. Do not place your purse or other valuables on the seats in plain view from the outside or unattended.

Subways, buses, and trains are safe but watch out for pickpockets and be ready for work stoppages.

Watch your bags at airports, bus, and ship terminals.

9. (U) DEMONSTRATIONS

Demonstrations are a frequent occurrence in Buenos Aires and other large cities and towns.

In Buenos Aires, demonstrations often occur in the downtown plazas, and near commercial and government buildings. Roadblocks (pickets) on major roads leading into the larger cities are also common.

Protests range in size from dozens to thousands of participants.

Most protests are peaceful, but may be loud due to sound systems, drums, and fireworks. The burning of effigies and flags is routine.

There are hooligan groups that will sometimes infiltrate protests in order to fight the police and engage in vandalism.

At soccer games, sit in the expensive seats and do not wear the colors of, or cheer for, the visiting team.

10. (U) FOR FURTHER INFORMATION:

Buenos Aires OSAC formally meets every quarter. The Washington, DC based OSAC Regional Coordinator for WHA or the Regional Security Office at American Embassy Buenos Aires can provide more information.

AMERICAN EMBASSY: (54)(11) 5777-4533
Regional Security Office 5777-4298
Marine Post 1 (24 hrs) 5777-4873

WAYNE

205622,5/5/2009 21:19,09BUENOSAIRES526,Embassy Buenos Aires,
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SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/05/2039
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, ELAB, KDEM, ECON, AR
SUBJECT: ARGENTINA’S PIQUETEROS: THE KIRCHNERS’ KEY PROTEST ARM

Classified By: CDA Tom Kelly for reasons 1.4 (b) & (d).

1. (SBU) Summary/Introduction: After being largely co-opted by the government of former President Nestor Kirchner (NK), some Argentine social protest groups, the “”piqueteros,”” have begun to distance themselves from current President Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner’s (CFK) government. They remain a force to be reckoned with, but their role in the 2009 mid-term congressional elections is not yet clear. It may be that the government has given them enough to sustain their support but not enough to gain their active mobilization. This cable analyzes the history of the piqueteros and their association with the Kirchner governments; a subsequent report will profile key leaders and examine particular groups’ roles and positions on key issues.

2. (SBU) As part of the Embassy’s ongoing efforts to reach out to a broad spectrum of Argentine society, Emboffs recently held a series of meetings with key piquetero leaders. This amorphous social movement has raised the profile of the concerns and demands of Argentina’s large under-class and has also played a role in amplifying the political power of the Kirchners, in part through marches, roadblocks, and boycotts. Many Argentines also view the GOA’s acquiescence in the piqueteros’ sometimes illegal tactics, particular roadblocks, as fostering a culture of lawlessness and intimidation. End Summary/Introduction.

Who are the Piqueteros?

-----------------------

3. (SBU) Argentina has, for over a decade, experienced organized protests and activism by social movements known as “”piqueteros””, which literally means “”picketers.”” These groups, primarily representing unemployed citizens, receive benefits from the national government to be distributed to their members (150-200 pesos a month, about US$40-53) in exchange for working 20 to 40 hours a week in workfare programs. According to 2007 national government statistics, the family aid plan reached 504,784 families, which includes 1,766,744 children. Local piquetero leaders believe the actual number of recipients has dropped as Argentina’s economy began to recuperate from its 2001 economic crisis. They estimate that only 800,000 Argentines are benefiting from these programs, while there are no government statistics on recipients after 2007.

4. (SBU) Piquetero organizations gained greater control over their funding during former President Fernando de la Rua’s (1999-2001) administration. Plan benefits were initially disbursed from the federal government through local city governments to beneficiaries. However, under De la Rua, 10% of the benefit plans were distributed directly through the piquetero associations once they registered their organizations. According to local academics, De la Rua was trying to limit piquetero power by requiring them to register before their members could receive benefits. However, in the process of “”legalizing”” them, he granted the groups direct access and control over their workfare programs. Once they gained some financial control, many groups concentrated on conserving and enlarging that funding through negotiation and protest with local and federal governments.

5. (SBU) Today, there are some 60 different piquetero organizations in Argentina, with the majority registered in the poorer suburbs of Buenos Aires. According to a 2002 UNDP report, there are at least three types of piquetero groups: those who fight for subsidies for social emergencies, those who seek to address collective needs in their communities, and those who promote micro-businesses. The five largest are the Federation of Land and Housing (FTV) with 125,000 members and led by the most notorious of the piqueteros, Kirchner ally Luis D’Elia; the Classicist and Combative Current (CCC) with 70,000 members; the Integrated Movement of Retired and Unemployed Persons (MIJD) with 60,000 members; the Standing Neighborhoods (Barrios de Pie) with 60,000 members; and the Worker Pole with 25,000 members. MTD Evita is smaller than the other groups, but their leader Emilio Persico, a strident supporter of the Kirchners and former Buenos Aires provincial official under former Governor Felipe Sola’s administration, -gfv is often able to mobilize some 2,000 people for pro-government protests. Many of these groups were initially allied (and some still are) with the unofficial labor confederation, Argentine Workers Central (CTA). Opposition piquetero groups tend to be more leftist, and the pro-Kirchner groups, while still leftist and virulently anti-American, have shown more flexibility. Most groups, regardless of their relationship with the Kirchner regime, are affiliated with the government by virtue of their government subsidies. However, MTD in La Matanza (a key electoral district in the poorer outskirts of Buenos Aires province) is one exception; it has refused government funding.

What are their Goals?

---------------------

6. (SBU) Many piquetero leaders approach key officials in government with one clear goal in mind: to increase their government subsidies in order to broaden their member base. If their demands are not met, they threaten or execute roadblocks and protests. Local analysts observe that election years, such as this year with Argentina’s mid-terms on June 28, are particularly favorable to piqueteros as the government tries to keep conflict low while securing as many votes as possible.

Piqueteros and the Kirchners

----------------------------

7. (SBU) Former President Nestor Kirchner (NK) saw in the piquetero movement a potential to strengthen support for his administration among the lower-class voting base. He won the allegiance of some piquetero groups by not suppressing their protests and including over 50 leaders in national and local government. NK’s treatment contrasted sharply with the police action against their protests during former Presidents Fernando De la Rua (1999-2001) and Eduardo Duhalde (2002-2003) administrations. NK also used the power of the purse to gain their loyalty, succeeding in co-opting half of the piquetero groups (FTV, Barrios de Pie, and MTD Evita) to protest on behalf of the government or mobilize in support of his administration.

8. (SBU) Although the piqueteros have gained greater official recognition from the national government since the Kirchners first came to power in 2003, they appear to have distanced themselves from the government during President Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner’s (CFK) administration. Groups which formerly supported NK have weakened their ties to the Kirchners during CFK’s administration while some, such as Barrios de Pie, have broken away and are openly courting other parties for the June elections. Out of the five key piquetero groups, only FTV remains firmly aligned to the Kirchners. Even that group may be wavering. Its leader Luis D’ Elia is currently feuding with NK on the grounds that his group is insufficiently represented in the government’s list of candidates for the mid-term election.

Origins of the Movement

-----------------------

9. (SBU) The movement dates back to the 1990s when the country experienced historically high levels of unemployment (18%) while many state-owned companies were privatized. The first “”piquetero”” demonstrations were held in late 1996/early 1997 by laid-off oil workers in Salta and Neuquen provinces. Demonstrators blocked roads, including a national highway, and demanded re-employment or new jobs. The protestors did nt disperse until the provincial governors offered to create new jobs. Although these early local protests were not linked to any parties or social plans, their success set the standard for other social activist movements. Social organizations not only assumed the piquetero name, but adopted the oil workers’ protest tactics. As a result, roadblocks flourished in Argentina increasing from 27 in 1997 in Buenos Aires province to a total of 7269 protests by 2005, according to local researchers.

10. (SBU) While the movement gained its name from the oil workers’ protests, the first government subsidy plan for unemployed workers was implemented in the early 1990s. Former President Carlos Menem implemented the first workfare plan in 1993 in response to increased unemployment generated by his privatization policies. In 2002, President Eduardo Duhalde, responding to 33 percent unemployment, created, “”Plan for Unemployed Heads of Household,”” (PJJHD) which aimed to reach all unemployed heads of households, with some two million Argentines receiving benefits by 2003, according to local social movement historians. NK converted the PJJHD plans into three separate plans: a family aid plan, a food security plan, and a local socio-economic development plan.

11. © Comment: Argentines are decidedly mixed on their views of the piqueteros. While many lower-class citizens see them as both a lifeline of support and as a legitimate tool for political protest, others, particularly in the middle classes, see them as reckless or even nihilistic. In the past, they have been a powerful tool for the Kirchners, but in a much less forgiving climate in the run-up to the June mid-terms, the ruling Victory Front seems less inclined to mobilize them (which explains NK’s recent tiff with D’Elia). The number one issue reported in many polls of voter concerns is public security and crime. Sending out piqueteros to block roads and pressure voters may not be the wisest of tactics in such a climate.

KELLY

215541,7/7/2009 21:35,09BUENOSAIRES794,Embassy Buenos Aires,
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C O R R E C T E D C O P Y - ADDED SIPDIS

SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/07/2029
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, ECON, PHUM, SOCI, ASEC, PTER, AR
SUBJECT: ARGENTINA: PROFILING KEY KIRCHNER-ALLIED PIQUETERO LEADERS

REF: (A) BUENOS AIRES 0526 (B) 08 BUENOS AIRES 1550
AND PREVIOUS © 08 BUENOS AIRES 1715 (D)
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Classified By: CDA Tom Kelly for reasons 1.4 (b) & (d).

1. (SBU) Summary: Despite sharing the same goals—job creation, social inclusion, and state intervention in the economy—the leaders of Argentina’s social activist movements, known as “”piqueteros,”” differ on how to achieve those objectives. Indeed, former President Nestor Kirchner’s efforts to co-opt these groups have divided the movement between those aligned with the Kirchners, those that actively oppose the government, and groups that maintain a more neutral position. This cable assesses the leaders of pro-Kirchner piquetero groups. Nicknamed by the press “”Piqueteros K,”” this group includes Luis D’Elia of the Federation of Land and Housing (FTV); Emilio Persico of the Movement of Unemployed Workers - Evita (MTD-Evita; and Lito Borello of “”The Guys”” (Los Pibes).

2. (SBU) As part of the Embassy’s ongoing efforts to reach out to a broad spectrum of Argentine society, Emboffs held a series of meetings with piquetero leaders, in addition to an academic expert on the movement. This cable is the second in a series on this key social movement, which while helping thousands of poor Argentines has also played a role in amplifying the political power of the Kirchners, in part through marches, roadblocks, and boycotts. While the first cable analyzed the history of the piqueteros and their association with the Kirchner Government (ref A), this cable will profile the Kirchners’ key piquetero allies and a subsequent message will discuss key piquetero opposition leaders. End Summary.

Who are the Piqueteros?

----------------------

3. (SBU) Argentina has, for over a decade, experienced organized protests and activism by social movements known as “”piqueteros””, which literally means “”picketers.”” These groups, representing the claims of unemployed citizens, distribute benefits from the national government (150-200 pesos, or USD 40-53, a month) to their members in exchange for working 20 to 40 hours a week in workfare programs. According to 2007 national government statistics, the family aid plan reached 504,784 families, which includes 1,766,744 children. Local piquetero leaders believe the actual number of recipients dropped as Argentina’s economy began to recuperate from its 2001 economic crisis. They estimate that only 800,000 Argentines are currently benefiting from these programs, while there are no government statistics on recipients after 2007.

4. © Many piquetero leaders initially distrusted former President Nestor Kirchner (NK) when he came to power in 2003. The piqueteros thought NK supported market-oriented economic policies, which they stridently oppose, and would repress their protest activities. However, early in his administration, NK won the allegiance of some piquetero leaders by not restricting their marches and by inviting their leaders to visit the Government House. Eventually, over 50 leaders joined national and local governments aligned with NK. These Kirchner supporters, nicknamed by the press “”Piqueteros K,”” include the Federation of Land and Housing (FTV) led by Luis D’Elia, Movement of Unemployed Workers - Evita (MTD-Evita) directed by Emilio Persico, and “”The Guys”” (Los Pibes) led by Lito Borello. The Foot Neighborhoods (Barrios de Pie), led by Jorge Ceballos, was also closely allied to NK. Two Barrios de Pie leaders worked in the national government in the ministries of Social Development and Foreign Affairs until December 2008, when they split from the Kirchners due to ideological differences. Ceballos ran unsuccessfully for national deputy in the June 28 legislative elections under the alliance New Encounter (Nuevo Encuentro).

Nonetheless, despite sharing similar goals and views, key piquetero leaders compete with one another for government resources and attention. A sociologist who has studied the movement for seven years succinctly described their relations: “”they hate each other.””

Luis D’Elia and the Federation of Land and Housing

--------------------------------------------- -----

5. (SBU) The most notorious of the piquetero leaders, Luis D’Elia, has led the Federation of Land and Housing (FTV) since the 1990s. With some 125,000 members, the FTV is the largest piquetero group. Although a vocal Kirchner supporter, D’Elia reportedly feuded with NK on the grounds that his group was insufficiently represented in the government’s list of candidates for the June mid-terms. D’Elia publicly criticized NK for not meeting with him to discuss his candidates’ positions on the Kirchner-allied ruling Victory Front’s (FpV) slate and for “”mistreating”” him. He publicly requested a meeting with NK to negotiate places on the FpV’s candidate slate, but was received instead by Interior Minister Florencio Randazzo and Intelligence Secretariat (SIDE) chief Hector Icazuriaga. According to press reports, D’Elia wanted between 30 and 40 seats ranging from town council to deputy and senatorial positions. Perhaps to curry favor with the Kirchners prior to the May 9 deadline to name candidate slates, D’Elia organized a 5,000 to 10,000-person march on May 7 in support of the FpV. The crowd carried the banner “”we won’t let (Vice President) Cobos be President on June 29.”” Despite D’Elia’s efforts, candidate slates were announced May 9 (ref C), with only one spot, fairly low on the list, for his organization (in this case D’Elia’s wife). Nonetheless, D’Elia remains publicly supportive of the Kirchners.

6. (SBU) Since 2003, D’Elia has led several marches (some violent) supporting the administrations of President Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner (CFK) and NK. In March 2008, D’Elia led violent protests during the government’s conflict with the farm sector over CFK’s bill to raise agricultural export taxes. (Criminal assault charges against D’Elia for publicly punching a farmer protesting Kirchner policies have stalled in the courts but remain pending.) In June 2008, he organized another march against the farm sector after circulating a rumor that former President Eduardo Duhalde, in alliance with farmers and the Clarin media group, was organizing a coup against CFK. In January 2009, D’Elia led a march against the Israeli Embassy to protest Israeli military action in the Gaza Strip.

7. © Viscerally anti-American, D’Elia was the key organizer behind the “”counter-summit”” to the Summit of Americas attended by then-President Bush in Mar del Plata in November 2005. Many reports indicated that D’Elia’s funding for the alternate summit and many other (often anti-U.S.) activities came from Venezuela’s Hugo Chavez. D’Elia himself admitted during an August 2007 television interview that Chavez provided funds to his group to pay for the militants’ transportation costs. Later, during a December 2008 interview with the weekly news magazine “”Noticias,”” D’Elia acknowledged that he received $1 million from Cuba to pay for buses for the militants (ref B) but did not mention any Venezuelan financial support. D’Elia has denied, however, press speculation that the infamous suitcase (stuffed with USD 800,000 and seized by Argentine customs in August 2007) was from Chavez and destined for D’Elia’s organization (ref C).

8. © A fiery orator, D’Elia, an Argentine of Palestinian heritage who identifies himself racially as “”black,”” is well-known for his invective-strewn remarks against the urban “”white”” middle- and upper-class. D’Elia has served as NK’s alter-ego, promoting ugly, racist opinions without explicitly tying the GOA to his words. Indeed, in March 2008 when tensions were high between the government and the farm sector, D’Elia, said he would “”not have problems in killing all of them (the oligarchs)”” in a clear reference to what he perceived as the wealthy farm sector and its supporters. This rhetoric damaged the Piqueteros’ public image in the eyes of Argentina’s middle class, 40% of whom approved of the piqueteros during Argentina’s economic crisis in 2001/2002. (Note: Current polls indicate that 70% of the middle class disapprove of the piqueteros.) According to a Poliarquia poll conducted nationwide in November 2008, 59% of Argentines surveyed held a negative impression of D’Elia, while only 8% viewed him favorably.

9. © D’Elia craves and capitalizes on the media attention his marches and close relations with the Kirchners have garnered him. According to newspaper-of-record “”La Nacion,”” he called the political satire program “”Big-Brother-in-Law,”” (“”Gran Cunado””) a bi-weekly political satire program, to remind the show to include him in its impersonations of Argentina’s most politically ambitious. D’Elia is a “”smart leader who takes radical positions,”” according to an Argentine sociologist and professor who has studied the piquetero movement for seven years and knows some of its leaders. The sociologist asserts that D’Elia’s punch of a farm sector supporter, which was caught on video during a March 2008 protest, was a calculated decision to prevent the media from running a storyline that he and his movement had weakened. (Note: There is currently a criminal case pending against D’Elia for this incident.) D’Elia’s brother has publicly described D’Elia as “”very difficult to stop... (and) very convinced of his own views.””

Iran Connection

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10. (SBU) A former teacher and union member, D’Elia initially ran for the Buenos Aires government in 1997 as a member of former President Fernando de La Rua,s Alianza-FREPASO ticket. With the worsening economy, D’Elia left Alianza and joined the Central Trabajadores Argentinos (CTA), the unofficial Workers’ Confederation that split from the official General Confederation of Workers (CGT) in the 1990s and has been seeking legal recognition since then. While in the CTA, D’Elia launched FTV. In February 2006, D’Elia was named Under Secretary of Land and Housing, a portfolio created for him by NK, according to local press. NK dismissed him in November 2006 shortly after D’Elia expressed public support for Iran and denounced GOA warrants against Iranians accused of participating in the bombing of the Buenos Aires Jewish Cultural center (AMIA) as part of a “”Jewish Lobby”” plot. In 2007, D’Elia traveled to Iran at the invitation of the Iranian government. Although D’Elia no longer holds a government post, he has an office in the GOA’s National Commission of Land and Housing (formerly Undersecretariat for Land and Housing), where he conducts daily meetings and acts as de-facto chief managing a budget of 14,500,000 pesos (approximately USD 4.2 million), according to a March 2008 article from “”La Nacion.”” D’Elia was born in 1957 in Buenos Aires Province. He is married and has two children.

Emilio Persico and MTD-Evita

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11. (SBU) Although MTD-Evita is a smaller piquetero organization, its leader, Emilio Persico, regularly organizes large, vocal groups to support the Kirchners. Politically opportunistic, Persico founded MTD-Evita in 2003, just as the piqueteros were beginning to gain power under the Kirchners. While Persico does not command a large group, he is able to organize the piquetero networks when the Kirchners need them and can be expected to draw at least 2,000 to most marches. In September 2007, Persico participated in a protest outside the U.S. Embassy calling for the release of the five Cuban spies detained in Miami. Before founding MTD-Evita, he co-founded Quebracho, a more violent piquetero group with roots in the 1970s Montonero movement.

12. (SBU) Persico’s political influence derives more from his position as the Peronist party’s secretary for relations with social organizations. In that capacity, he reports to NK in the latter’s function as PJ president. The piquetero expert and sociologist we consulted said that of all the piquetero leaders, Persico is the most opportunistic and in that vein has sought to maintain the strongest relations with the Kirchners. Nonetheless, Persico’s relations with the Kirchners were probably diminished somewhat when in mid-March he told the press that if the Kirchners lost the June midterms “”(Vice President) Cobos and the Clarin Group could take over.”” Many press interpreters characterized the remarks as Persico’s dim-witted repetition of NK’s for-private-consumption-only grousing. Persico sought to rectify his apparent blunder by remarking that he meant he did not want the country to be left in the hands of Cobos and his ilk (ref D).

13. (SBU) Like D’Elia, Persico has previous government experience. He served in 2006 as vice cabinet chief for former Buenos Aires Governor Felipe Sola. (Note: In the June mid-terms, Sola won a national deputy candidate seat under the Union-Pro slate, ref E.) During a 2006 press interview, Persico acknowledged his “”unconditional identification with Kirchner’s popular project,”” and stated that MTD-Evita would help “”unite all social organizations as they integrate their vision into the national government.”” Born in 1958, Persico hails from a wealthy family. His extended family owns a popular ice-cream chain in Buenos Aires. Among the least educated piquetero leaders, Persico was expelled from high school and never returned to complete his degree.

Lito Borello and Los Pibes

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14. (SBU) Los Pibes’ director Lito Borello is known as a militant piquetero in the traditional confrontational style. He openly supports the Kirchners, and has received from their governments several grants for projects to improve the living conditions of poor residents of the La Boca area of Buenos Aires Federal District. A long-time local Buenos Aires city piquetero leader, Borello joined D’Elia in 2004 in the siege of a police station after the police shot a fellow piquetero leader. Borello’s main goals are to give the piquetero organizations a political role and incorporate their vision and dialogue into the GOA, rather than march against it.

15. (SBU) Borello founded Los Pibes in 1996 in response to the economic situation and poverty in La Boca. Los Pibes, which had its start as soup kitchen, now serves a community of 250 families, building houses, providing after school activities, adult education, and textile jobs. Los Pibes Food Director Nadia Martinez praised the Kirchner government’s social inclusion policies, especially the Ministry of Social Development (directed by NK’s sister, Alicia), noting that it had funded several of their projects aimed at integrating the community and providing job-training. In contrast to reports that projects are not tied to true work, Martinez reported that the Kirchner administration carefully monitors each of their projects. She contrasted the Kirchners’ inclusive policies Buenos Aires City Mayor Mauricio Macri,s more top-down projects, which she claimed do not include integration and capacity building and little citizen involvement. Martinez noted that Los Pibes also hosts several foreign students annually who participate in community internship projects.

16. (SBU) Borello has limited government experience. He briefly worked in Buenos Aires city government for former Mayor Jorge Telerman as part of an agreement between the city and the human rights organization, Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo. This agreement stipulated that social organizations would actively participate in the design, designation, and administration of social projects. Borello left the position because he believed the city government was not trying to incorporate the piquetero perspective, but was only paying lip service to the Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo. Borello lives in a humble boarding house.

Comment

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17. © The Kirchners’ relations with piquetero leaders can best be described as a marriage of convenience. Given the piqueteros’ limited representation on candidate slates in the June 28 elections, it appears that NK is seeking some distance, at least temporarily. In the wake of NK’s second-place finish in Buenos Aires province, he is probably wary of being identified too closely with the piqueteros’ strident rhetoric and violent tendencies, even though individual leaders such as D’Elia and Persico have sometimes been identified as among his most trusted and cosseted allies.

KELLY